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Benjamin. T. H. Varcoe
Abstract—This paper presents a method of cryptographic key
distribution using an ‘artificially’ noisy channel. This is an
important development because, while it is known that a noisy
channel can be used to generate unconditional secrecy, there are
many circumstances in which it is not possible to have a noisy
information exchange, such as in error corrected communication
stacks. It is shown that two legitimate parties can simulate a
noisy channel by adding local noise onto the communication
and that the simulated channel has a secrecy capacity even if
the underlying channel does not. A derivation of the secrecy
conditions is presented along with numerical simulations of the
channel function to show that key exchange is feasible.
Index Terms—Cryptography, secret key agreement, public
discussion protocols, secrecy capacity, wire-tap channel, privacy
amplification
I. INTRODUCTION
AFundamental aspect of cryptography is the ability to ex-change information in perfect secrecy. However, almost
all current forms of encryption rely on computational rather
than information theoretic security. Computationally secure
coding uses encryption techniques for which the known hack-
ing algorithms require lengthy calculations and they therefore
assume that the eavesdropper has a limited computational
capability. Information theoretic security, on the other hand,
makes no assumptions about an eavesdroppers capability. This
is an important distinction because the computational difficulty
can change with advances in algorithms and increased speed
of calculation, leading to significant cryptographic breaks.
One solution to producing a perfectly encrypted message is
the One Time Pad where the cryptographer has an infinite
supply of symmetric key that is consumed as a resource
in encrypting information. However, this creates the obvious
problem of creating and securely distributing large amounts
of symmetric key material. To address this problem several
methods have been proposed for creating and agreeing on
a perfectly secure key of arbitrary length under information
theoretic security [1]–[8].
In particular, it has been shown [3], [4], [7], [9] that channel
noise can be exploited to create and distribute symmetric key
material in near perfect secrecy. The essential element is the
use of feedback [5], [7]–[11], which exploits uncertainties
in Eve’s (the eavesdropper’s) information, via a specially
prepared sequence of messages, to generate random bit se-
quences known to the communicating pair, Alice and Bob, and
unknown to Eve. Hence, the secrecy of the channel is given
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by the combination of information transmitted over both the
noisy and noise-free channels.
The noisy channel model has been studied for several
decades now (see for example [3], [4], [6]–[8], [10]) and it
has been well established that when the mutual information
between two distributions A and B exceeds the mutual in-
formation between A and E (that is I(A;B) > I(A;E)) it
is possible to build a secret key from distributions A and B
excluding E. Maurer [7] recognized that this condition was too
strong and there are circumstances when I(A;B) < I(A;E)
and/or I(A;B) < I(B;E) but secret key generation is
still possible. In particular, feedback between Alice and Bob
permits the generation of a sequence of messages M t =
[M1,M2, . . . ,Mt] which can be used to generate Aˆ = M tA,
Bˆ = M tB and Eˆ = M tE such that
I(Aˆ; Bˆ) > I(Aˆ; Eˆ).
The scenario works as follows, Alice and Bob first exchange
symbols over the noisy channel. They then use feedback
signals exchanged over an error-corrected channel to arrive
at a secret key. Information Alice, Bob and Eve obtain about
the secret key therefore comes from correlations in the signals
and the joint information gained from the subsequent feedback
messages.
The conditions of feedback are therefore an important aspect
of distilling the secret key. The feedback must be constructed
to allow Alice and Bob to use correlations in their data to
exclude Eve. One way for them to do this is for Alice and Bob
to reduce the errors in a subsequent communication channel.
There are several codings that could be used for this purpose
[12]. As Eve has errors in her knowledge of both Alice’s
and Bob’s bit sequences, the coding only gives her partial
information and she therefore receives the signals with errors
cascaded over either Alice’s or Bob’s channel (depending on
the nature of the reconciliation). It has been shown [7], [8],
[12] that this gives Alice and Bob an advantage over Eve. This
procedure can be cascaded to align their information while
maintaining a well defined upper limit on Eve’s information.
Moreover, knowing the upper limit on Eve’s information, Alice
and Bob can subsequently use privacy amplification [5], [10]
to reduce Eve’s information to an arbitrarily small level.
The essential element of secret key generation is that
the noise channel is capable of generating a sufficient and
predictable level of uncertainty in the information received
by Eve. Quantum key distribution [1], [2] is one way of
ensuring a guaranteed minimum level of channel noise and it
comes with the added benefit that the security is protected by
the physical limitations of quantum mechanical measurement.
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However, as noted above, any noisy communications channel
where Alice, Bob and Eve receive noisy copies of a signal,
is also theoretically secure when it is assumed that each party
receives uncorrelated noise.
Hence, an implementation of any cryptographic scheme will
be strongly dependent on the specific properties of the channel
and all of the apparatus surrounding it, because changes to the
detectors, source or even medium (e.g. free space or wave-
guide) can change the noise and hence the secrecy conditions.
Secrecy can even be removed entirely if the noise falls below a
given threshold. Continuous variable quantum communication,
for example, typically includes essential device calibration
[13]. For this reason it is interesting to consider a method
that would generate unconditional channel noise and therefore
secrecy in key generation.
The current paper presents a method of applying uncondi-
tional noise to generate secrecy in a channel with no a priori
secrecy capacity. Specifically it is found that if the signal
is degraded locally (independent of transmission or detection
noise) and by both Alice and Bob independently, the channel
gains the ability to create a secret symmetric key even if it
otherwise has no prior secrecy capacity.
II. SECRET KEYS FROM CHANNEL NOISE
It has been established that a noisy channel where, in
particular, Eve and Bob both have reception errors is capable
of secret communication while a perfect, noise-free commu-
nication channel has zero secrecy capacity [3], [4], [6]–[8],
[10], [14]. However there are many channels in where noisy
communication is not possible, or where an unconditionally
noisy channel is not guaranteed. In such channels we propose
that Alice and Bob use a local noise source to create an
artificially noisy channel, simply by adding local noise after
the transmission (Fig.1). Although Eve can receive a noiseless
copy of the original data, it will now be shown that by altering
their channel Alice and Bob have effectively simulated a
noisy channel and can distill a correlated data set unknown
to Eve. Alice and Bob have effectively generated a non-zero
secrecy capacity at the expense of reducing the overall channel
capacity.
In the arguments that follow it is assumed that Eve can
detect all transmissions from Alice (and Bob) with no error
and that she receives a signal that is identical to the receiver
at all times. This represents the best possible case for Eve.
In this model (without loss of generality) Alice transmits a
random number R to Bob over an otherwise noiseless channel.
Alice, Bob and Eve then use a local true random number
generator to generate the random number sets NA, NB and
NE respectively, such that Eve cannot independently deduce
the values NA or NB from her knowledge of NE and R.
Alice and Bob and Eve use these to generate the variables
Xi = Ri ⊕NAi , (1)
Yi = Ri ⊕NBi (2)
and
Zi = Ri ⊕NEi (3)
g
NAi
?
Alice
Xi Ri -ff g
Bob
NBi
?
Yi
6⊕
EveZi
NEiff
Fig. 1. This figure presents the communication scheme, where Alice initially
transmits R to Bob (and Eve) over a public line. Alice and Bob (and Eve)
then add noise to the random variable using local noise sources, NA, NB
and NE . This results in the variables X , Y and Z for Alice, Bob and Eve
respectively, which will be the starting point for further communication.
respectively. NAi , N
B
i and N
E
i are random biased bits with
probabilities P (NAi = 0) = 1−α, P (NAi = 1) = α, P (NBi =
0) = 1 − β, P (NBi = 1) = β (where 0 < α, β < 1 ),
P (NEi = 0) = 1−γ and P (NEi = 1) = γ (where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1).
The range of γ expresses the fact that the value NEi could
contain any level of noise ranging from complete uncertainty
to being an error free reception of Ri.
This effectively creates new binary symmetric channels
between Alice and Bob and Alice and Eve shown in Fig. 2.
Where the bit flip probabilities α, β and γ are related to the
binary symmetric error rates  and δ via  = α+β−2αβ and
δ = α + γ − 2αγ. Importantly both δ > 0 and  > 0 even if
γ = 0 as long as both α > 0 and β > 0.
It is worth noting that Eve might tamper with the initial
transmission of R, which effectively amounts to creating a
new variable Ti, where P (Ti = 0) = 1 − τ , P (Ti = 1) = τ .
This would lead to Bob receiving a new variable Y ′i = Yi⊕Ti.
This has the same effect as transmission noise and may make
key agreement between Alice and Bob more difficult, but it
is not impossible as long as I(Y ;Y ′) 6= 0 6= I(X;Y ′) [7].
Tampering is considered in more detail below.
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Fig. 2. The transmission line model presented in figure 1 in which Alice
transmits a signal to Bob over an error free channel with local degradation
of the data, can be rewritten as a series of binary symmetric channels linking
Alice and Bob and Alice and Eve, where  = α+β−2αβ is the convolution of
local noise between Alice and Bob and δ = α+ γ − 2αγ is the convolution
of local noise between Alice and Eve, with α, β and γ as local bit flip
probabilities (defined in the text).
It is therefore proposed that for α > 0, β > 0 and
γ ≥ 0 a channel has been created with a capacity for secrecy,
irrespective of the properties of the underlying channel. This is
a new condition introduced in this paper that does not match
the conditions established previously [7]–[9]. It is therefore
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not immediately clear that a protocol can even be constructed
with the capacity for secrecy. The secrecy proof is re-visited
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For the binary distribution X , Y and Z
given by the conditions in equations 1, 2 and 3 and assuming
α = β, the proposition is that for any γ ≥ 0 a coding sequence
exists such that variables Xˆ , Yˆ and Zˆ can be derived from X ,
Y , and Z such that the channel has a positive secrecy capacity.
Proof: Alice and Bob open a virtual channel where
Alice encodes a random number, C, using a simple encoding
of sending an N -fold repeated message [7] encrypted using
N-bits from X via [Xi ⊕ C,Xi+1 ⊕ C, . . . ,Xi+N−1 ⊕ C].
Bob calculates the sequence C ′ using the sequence Y via
[Xi ⊕ C ⊕ Yi, Xi+1 ⊕ C ⊕ Yi+1, . . . , Xi+N−1 ⊕ C ⊕ Yi+N−1]
and accepts the value of C ′ only when he has obtained the
vectors [0, 0, . . . , 0] or [1, 1, . . . , 1]. This encoding therefore
creates a new binary symmetric channel between Alice and
Bob with error probability, N , given by
N =
PError
PCorrect + PError
=
N
(1− )N + N , (4)
where PError is the probability that the bit calculated by
Bob is not equal to the bit encoded by Alice and PCorrect is
the probability that the two are equal. Eve can also calculate
‘C’ using her variables [Zi, Zi+1, . . . , Zi+N−1], however, it
is assumed that Eve takes a more sophisticated approach than
Bob and calculates the value of ‘C’ based on the most likely
value. Errors in Eve’s calculation are therefore determined by
the number of sequences with N/2 errors or more, given that
the sequence has been accepted by Bob. Eve’s error in the N -
fold virtual channel is δN , assuming Eve adds no noise (i.e.
γ = 0). Hence, the best match that Eve can achieve to Bob’s
data is given by the binomial probability [7], [8],
δN =
1
PTotal
N∑
w=N/2
(
N
w
)(
pN−w00 p
w
01 + p
N−w
10 p
w
11
)
(5)
where, PTotal is the total number of states accepted by
Bob, pnm is the probability that when the result of Alice’s
calculation (R + Noise) is 0, Bob’s result is n and Eve’s
result is m. In this specific case their values are given by,
PTotal = PCorrect + PError = (1− )N + N ,
p00 = (1− α)2,
p01 = α
2,
and
p10 = p11 = α(1− α).
Considering only the special case that Bob has accepted a
sequence and the sequence decoded by Eve has equal numbers
of 1s and 0s (that is, Eve has a 50% transmission error), we
are left with,
δN >
1
PTotal
(
N
N/2
)(
2(α− α2)N) .
At this point a choice of coding is made, deciding on the
specific value of N = 2. Under these conditions the errors in
Eve’s calculation are given by,
δN=2 >
4(α− α2)2
PTotal
.
However equation 4 shows that when N = 2 and α = β,
Bob’s error is also given by
N=2 =
2
PTotal
=
(2α− 2α2)2
PTotal
. (6)
Hence, δN=2 is always strictly greater than N=2. It follows
that I(Xˆ; Yˆ ) > I(Yˆ ; Zˆ) and therefore S(Xˆ; Yˆ ||Zˆ) > 0 [8].
This is sufficient even if it is only true for the special case of
N = 2.
This proposition is useful because it also provides a protocol
with which a secret key can be established. Alice can repeat the
exchange with same transmission steps (and different random
variables C), knowing that Eve’s ability to calculate the value
will be worse than Bob’s because Eve started with an imperfect
code Zˆ. This can be repeated until Alice and Bob have n-bit
sets Sn and S′n, where Prob(S 6= S′n) < κ. Likewise Eve will
have S′′n for which Prob(S = S
′′
n) < λ, for some choice of κ
and λ.
For sufficiently small κ we have
I(Sn;S
′
n)− I(Sn;S′′n) ≈ 1− I(Sn;S′′n) ≤ k,
indicating that Eve’s knowledge of Sn is upper bounded by
k. Therefore, privacy amplification [11] can be used then be
used to further reduce Eve’s information using a hash function
Fn,k which performs a mapping from Alice and Bob’s n bit
sequence to a sequence of length n(1 − k) bits. This creates
new n(1 − k) length sets Fn,k(S′′) and Fn,k(S′) = Fn,k(S)
such that I(Fn,k(S′′);Fn,k(S)) ≈ 0. If the hash function
Fn,k is decided after the protocol has been completed, Eve
cannot influence the exchanges in advance in order to create
a favorable situation.
Figure 3 presents the results of a simulation of random
data exchanged between Alice and Bob, followed by adding
local noise (the first two steps in the protocol). The simulation
modeled a real exchange, where bit strings and added noise
were generated using a random number generator and the
signal was sent virtually between analysis programs. In this
case the random number generator fails a universal statistical
test [15] so this particular exchange has limited capacity
for generating actual secrecy, however, it does allow us to
investigate the statistical effects of added noise. The solid
line is an evaluation of equations 4 and 5 and the open and
closed circles are the results of the simulation for Bob and
Eve respectively. This simulation shows that for all values of
noise α > 0 to α < 1/2 (with α = β) the noise in Eve’s
channel exceeds the noise in Bob’s channel following the first
exchange.
III. EAVESDROPPING
It is also worth considering the type of eavesdropping
attacks that might be expected and how they are thwarted.
For this purpose, the system can be broken down into two
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Fig. 3. Theory vs simulation evaluations of the binary symmetric channel
errors γN and N for the virtual channel for N=2 as a function of the error
rate α. The solid line is from equations 4 and 5 and the points are the results
of the simulations. For this graph, α = β and 100,000 samples were taken. It
shows that the error rate for Eve always exceeds that of Bob for all choices
of α.
elements; the private channel in which the key material is
exchanged and the public channel in which the two way
communication used to distill the secret key takes place.
The private channel is always used for the exchange of
random variables which will be unknown to Bob in advance
of the exchange. Hence it is possible that Eve could tamper
or otherwise interfere with these transmissions by removing,
altering or inserting symbols without Bob knowing.
It is also assumed that Eve is only able to read but
not modify messages in the authenticated public channel.
Authentication in this case meaning that Alice and Bob are
authenticated users rather than referring to the security of the
connection itself.
Eve has two possible attacks. Firstly she can look for
correlations in the data exchanged and try to use this to gain
insight into the final key (more than the insight she gains
by simply following Alice and Bob’s protocol). Secondly,
she can manipulate the symbols exchanged; for example, by
performing selected bit flips in some of the data exchanged.
The first attack carries no additional information because
the key is not sourced from the initial data but rather from
the elements C used in subsequent exchanges. Moreover the
noise, NA and NB and the virtual channel value C are chosen
such that I(X;C) = I(Y ;C) = I(Z;C) = 0, hence no
information about C can be gained from observations of the
initial code R.
The second attack is somewhat more important because
it can go unnoticed especially as Bob is already expecting
unknown random data. However, as the statistics cannot be
altered from the original and the number of bits must still
be the same, Bob can perform local checks to ensure that
the data is still random. Therefore the attack may be quite
subtle. For example, it could be assumed that Eve’s goal in
manipulating the data is not to reveal the secret key itself but
rather to reveal a few additional bits of each exchange that
will be unaccounted for in the privacy amplification. Eve may
Fig. 4. This figure shows simulations results of the percentage of values
retained (PTotal) at the first exchange when Alice and Bob introduce 16%
errors in their data, for an initial exchange of 5 × 105 bits. The error bars
represent 1 standard deviation of error in the simulation results. Tampering is
detectable at the 2− 3% level.
use this to gain a cryptographic break over the final key (Eve
may, for example, wish to reduce the search space in a brute
force key guessing attack). She may even consider an attack
where small amounts of information accumulated over a very
long period of time eventually reveals significant amounts of
information (precisely how this is achieved is not considered
here). A low level tampering attack is therefore an important
consideration.
As noted above, any tampering attack would take the form
of introducing the tamper variable T , to the message text via
R′i = Ri⊕Ti before it is sent on to Bob. Bob’s local variable
therefore becomes
Y ′i = Yi ⊕ Ti = Ri ⊕NBi ⊕ Ti.
Eve cannot know NB therefore it is necessarily the case that
I(NB ;T ) = 0. The act of tampering modifies the binary
symmetric channel between Alice and Bob (figure 2) changing
the error rate from  to ′,
′ = (β + τ) + α− 2(β + τ)α = + ∆
where ∆ = τ(1−2α). The result is an increase in the channel
noise between Alice and Bob without changing the channel
noise between Eve and Alice, assuming that Eve does not
incorporate the tamper variable in her own data (if she does,
her error actually exceeds Bob’s and secrecy is maintained).
Figure 4 shows the impact of tampering attacks on the value
of PTotal for attacks modifying 0−5% of the data. Hence, this
particular tampering attack is detectable by examining PTotal
which reduces as a function of τ . Alice and Bob can monitor
PTotal, with any significant drop indicating a tampering attack.
A 2−5% attack is clearly detectable and is outside a standard
deviation of variation of the untampered value.
This leaves a potential vulnerability to tampering attacks
that introduce less than 2% errors. The full protocol of key
agreement now becomes important. It has already been shown
that small amounts of tampering reduce Bob’s mutual informa-
tion with Alice and hence PTotal in the first exchange, however
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Fig. 5. This figure shows simulations the final secret key after four rounds
of data matching, for an initial exchange of 5×105 bits. The final key rate is
given by (1 − I(Sn;S′′n))PFinal, where PFinal is the final matching key
agreed between Alice and Bob. The error bars represent 1 standard deviation
statistical errors in the simulation results. In this simulation Alice and Bob
introduce 16% errors in their data.
it also, simultaneously, reduces Eve’s mutual information with
Bob.
In their exchange, and in the presence of tampering, Alice
and Bob will arrive at the key source ST and S′T respectively
which will have been reduced in size by Eve’s tampering.
However, as key agreement is driven by Bob and not Alice,
the final value of I(ST ;S′′T ) must therefore also be reduced,
precisely because Eve has distanced herself from Bob. It
remains the case that Eve’s best attack is to do nothing.
Finally in completing the protocol, Alice and Bob, unaware
of the tampering, can always use a Hash code derived without
knowing the details of the attack and assuming a perfect Eve.
Figure 5 shows the final key agreed by Alice and Bob when
Eve has tampered with the data. The key rate stays broadly flat
with I(§n;S′′n) ≈ 0. This is true for small levels of tampering
and the situation changes if the error is substantially above
5%, hence continual monitoring of PTotal is essential. Alice
should therefore also keep track of the information that Eve
would have at each level of the protocol.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates the exchange of secret keys us-
ing an arbitrary communication channel with no a priori
assumptions. This could therefore include channels such as the
TCP/IP stack, or error corrected radio communication stacks.
In this model Alice and Bob (the legitimate communicators)
add noise to the data to simulate the action of a noisy channel.
It has also been shown that a communication protocol exists
that can be used to distill a secret key.
The nature of the noise is however key to the secrecy
and therefore it must be unpredictable. Hence, the essential
element is that the noise should be supplied by a truly random
source. In practice this means that it should probably be
sourced from quantum effects as these are both unpredictable
and cannot, typically, be externally manipulated.
A feedback mechanism was also demonstrated where a new
data set was constructed using a virtual error corrected channel
exchanging data pairs. This was shown to be capable of
enhancing the overlap between Alice and Bob while reducing
the noise in Eve. A potential attack has been considered where
Eve attempts to degrade her data. This attack has been shown
to lead to increased secrecy.
The final step of extracting a key uses a two-way feedback
protocol. Such a protocol has not been considered in any detail
in the current paper, however there are many examples in the
literature that can be followed (see for example [11], [12],
[16]–[18]).
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